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REVISION OF CRIMINAL LAW-OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
Jerome Hall*

There are encouraging signs of the timeliness, of criminal law revision and of the recognition of its importance. For example, the current project to provide a model penal code under the auspices of the
American Law Institute' has engaged the services of distinguished
lawyers, judges, and scholars. And the recently announced program
of the American Bar Association to survey the administration of
criminal justice is sponsored by leaders of the American bar, including
a Justice of the United States Supreme Court.2 This interest in
criminal law is rooted in the traditions of the American bar. Thus,
while the unparalleled economic progress following the Civil War
greatly influenced professional attitudes, it is an indubitable fact that
prior to the present century many eminent lawyers, including such
immortals as Webster and Lincoln, practiced criminal law without
apology; indeed, with satisfaction and pride. That this tradition is still
alive, even if it is not widely appreciated, is evident, e.g., in the careers
of Borah, Darrow, and Warren as well as in current important projects
to improve the criminal law.
But, although there is very much in criminal law to stir the imagination and enlist the services of the ablest lawyers and scholars in
thorough-going efforts to improve it, it is no less true that any enlistment short of that will prove inadequate to the onerous tasks of revision. The reasons for this will be apparent in the following discussion.
Objectives

The ultimate objectives of the criminal law may be described in
terms of order, survival, security, maintenance of conditions which
permit progress to be made (the "conditions of civilization"), experience of the "higher" values and, finally, "the good life," which subsumes all the ideals toward which a rational, democratic society moves.
In this discussion these ultimate objectives are assumed, and the
analysis will be concerned with the proximate objective, namely, the
*

Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School.
See Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097

(1952).
2
See Jackson, et. al, Criminal Justice: The Vital Problems of the Future,
39 A.B.A.J. 743 (1953).
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soundest possible criminal law, together with significant critiques and
theories supporting the suggested revision. Perhaps the simplest approach is to ask-what are the principal shortcomings of the substantive criminal law? We shall thus delineate specific objectives in
terms of the removal of these limitations and of progress in related
directions.
The glaring defect in the criminal law of most states is the disorganization of the statutes. The typical picture is one of an amorphous mass of statutes unrelated to each other or to any unifying
ideas. Enterprising publishers and state officials have brought together
statutes bearing on the various crimes, but it is not unusual to find
criminal laws in remote reaches of the statute book, including noncriminal areas. Far from any persistent use of doctrines and principles, the fact is that in only a few states has anything approaching
systematization of the criminal law been attempted. Lawyers and
judges are thus handicapped in their work and their effectiveness is
seriously impaired.
The contrast with the criminal codes of European countries is
striking. These codes are usually divided into two parts, a "general
part," which includes doctrines applying to all the specific crimes, e.g.,
those concerning insanity, mistake, coercion, and so on, and a "special
part," where the rules defining particular aspects of the offenses are
classified, usually in accordance with types of crime. By use of such
an orderly arrangement not only can the relevant laws be easily
located but, also, and much more important, the advantages of
organized knowledge, as opposed to the handicaps of a collection of
disparate data, are operative.3 The public is also interested in knowing various phases of the law of crimes, and if lawyers experience
difficulty in working with that law, the complications must utterly
dismay laymen who are limited to the statute book.4 In addition, many
offenders who should be subjected to treatment or punishment escape
because of the current confusion and complexities.
Especially unfortunate is the extreme disorganization of the treatment-punishment provisions attached to the commission of the various
crimes. There has hardly ever been a careful survey and analysis of
this aspect of the criminal law with a view to providing a sound,
consistent body of sanctions. The present provisions represent intermittent responses to pressures on legislatures, reactions to public
8These problems are discussed in Hall, Science and Reform in Criminal
Law, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 787 (1952), reprinted in, Readings in Philosophy of
Science 297 (Wiener ed. 1953).
'In ancient Greece every citizen was a lawyer, and the United States, too,
has been called "a nation of lawyers." It does not seem far-fetched to suggest
that intelligent citizens should know at least the fundamentals of the criminal
law.
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opinion which sometimes borders on hysteria or, at best, intelligent
guesswork. It is little wonder that, with such sanctions deeply embedded in the statute book, the actual sentencing of offenders shows
indefensible variations and unfortunate effects not only on resentful
convicted persons but also on the community which maintains expensive peno-correctional institutions and bears the brunt of their
unregenerated output. Here, in sum, it is easy to see the evils of piecemeal legislation and to appreciate the value of logic because sustained
efforts to organize the statutes practically compel inclusive analysis
and synthesis in terms of similarities, differences, and interrelation-

ships.
No less important than organization of the statutes is the articulation of the values of modern Anglo-American criminal law in terms
of a sound policy which is applied throughout that field of law.
The law of crimes, in the course of its development from the 13th
century, has reflected various attitudes towards criminal conduct; and
negligence, recklessness, intentional harm-doing, and certain behavior
"at peril" became the recognized grounds of liability. Exc'ept in a few
segments, progress in moral attitudes has been reflected in the continuous narrowing of criminal liability to morally culpable conduct.
Thus, at present, except in certain corners of the common law of
crimes, to be noted shortly, mens rea is restricted there to intentional
and to reckless misconduct, 5 i.e., to the voluntary commission of a
harm. What emerges as perhaps the most important challenge to
those who engage in criminal law revision is, therefore, this questiondoes further improvement of the criminal law require the total
restriction of criminal liability to such conduct?
The principal areas of the criminal law which need to be explored
in order to solve this problem concern objective liability, negligence,
the felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter rules, and strict
liability. While a careful study of these crucial areas leads to conclusions of the utmost importance for revision of the criminal law, it is
possible here only to comment briefly on salient features of the
necessary inquiries.6
Objective liability, the "reasonable man" standard, is applied
chiefly in the law of criminal homicide to limit "provocation" and "cooling time" and, generally, to limit mistakes of fact and the privilege of
self-defense.7 Elsewhere, indeed in most of the criminal law, the test
is the subjective one, and this is emphasized in such a sophisticated
crime as receiving stolen property, where the majority rule is that
See Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law 29-30 (Turner's ed. 1952).
These are discussed in detail in Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law
(1947).
8

'An exceptional case is State v. Cope, 78 Ohio 429, 67 N.E.2d 912 (1946),
quoting from State v. Sheets, 115 Ohio St. 308, 152 N.E. 664 (1926).
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criminal liability is determined not by the belief of the "reasonable
man" that the goods were stolen but, instead, by the actual belief of
the defendant on trial." It is evident that there are serious questions
raised in holding a person criminally liable not on the basis of the
actual condition of his mind and body at the time he committed a
legally forbidden harm, but on the basis of how an "average person"
would have behaved in those circumstances. If the defendant is, unfortunately, one of those persons who are neither average nor psychotic9 is it morally defensible to hold him to the objective standard when
the consequence is punishment?
Negligence, in the usual, the tort, sense of the term (behavior inadvertently below reasonable care) has been continuously narrowed in
the criminal law. Perhaps the most frequent instance of this is found
in the law on homicide by use of an automobile, which, though designated "negligent" homicide, is in almost all jurisdictions interpreted
to mean reckless homicide. But negligence persists in some corners
of the criminal law to obstruct the march of consistent policy. Applying the objective test, courts transform avowed recklessness into
negligence, e.g., the Tort's Restatement definition of recklessness is
adopted. Statutory lesser degrees of manslaughter sometimes require
only negligence; and negligence is involved in the causal ramifications
of homicide. But, although the collateral influence of negligence is
consequently important and many ill-conceived statutes penalize
negligent behavior, the tendency has been definitely to exclude it
from criminal law when the courts have faced the issues directly. 10
Punishment of inadvertent adults is a sorry business; it has no proper
place in modern criminal liability. Social utility is, of course, important; but that does not imply that we should reverse the trend
spontaneously manifested in the case law, especially during the present
century, on the supposition that negligent harmdoers can be deterred
by the threat of punishment. In fact, available studies indicate that
nothing is gained in learning habits or sensitivity by being punished
for negligence.

'Commonwealth v. Boris, 317 Mass. 309, 58 N.E.2d 8 (1944).
'Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). But cf. Wilson v. Inyang [1951]
2 K.B.
799.
1
See, e.g., Roper v. Taylor's Central Garages Ltd. [1951] 2 T.L.R. 284,
in which Devlin, J. said: "There is a vast distinction between a state of mind
which consists of deliberately refraining from making inquiries, the result
of which the person does not care to have, and a state of mind which is merely
neglecting to make such inquiries as a reasonable and prudent person would
make .... The case of shutting the eyes is actual knowledge in the eyes of the
law; the case of merely neglecting to make inquiries is not knowledge at all
-it comes within the legal conception of constructive knowledge, a conception
which, generally speaking, has no place in the criminal law." And see the
thoughtful opinion of Campbell, J. in State v. Pickus, 63 S.D. 209, 257 N.W.
284 (1934).
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The community is clearly entitled to legal protection against negligent harmdoers, especially when they operate dangerous instru-

mentalities or businesses affecting health. In addition, the facilities of
administrative boards can be used to educate negligent or awkward
persons. Thus, the exclusion of negligence from criminal liability does
not imply indifference to social needs. The pertinent question is simply
this-should the criminal law be used in dealing with negligent harmdoers? And in answering that question the most important consideration is the moral significance of criminal law and how that can be
made more effective.
If the issues concerning negligence should be resolved in the way
suggested above, there could hardly be much doubt regarding the
persistence of that strange m6lange, "strict liability," in the field of
criminal law. For, whatever view one takes regarding its utility, it is
everywhere recognized that the law of strict liability is not criminal
law. Thoughtful analyses of the subject run in terms not of crimes
but of "public torts," "civil offenses," "quasi offenses," "not criminal
in any real sense,"" and the like. Nor is the issue a merely academic
or verbal one. The inclusion of strict liability statutes among criminal
laws and the use of the language of criminal law lead to confusion and
to long terms of imprisonment for conduct wholly free of mens Tea.
There is injustice even when the penalties are relatively small, e.g.,
businessmen who have employed the best experts and utilized the
latest scientific apparatus in the operation of their business, are hailed
into criminal courts, subjected to criminal trials, and punished. The
ineffectiveness of this sort of crude instrumentation (defensible, perhaps, when it originated a hundred years ago, long before the progress
in administration and administrative agencies) is an additional reason
2
for excluding strict liability from the criminal law.'
A sustained effort to achieve a coherent policy in the criminal law
must also take account of the felony-murder, misdemeanor-manslaughter rules. While it is not easy to employ ethical refinements in
dealing with criminals, especially felons, that is the distinctive feature
of the greatest part of our criminal law. This is evident, e.g., in the
classification of criminal homicides where, in a crude sense, the harm
committed is the same throughout; but modern penal law exhibits
an enormous range in punishments-from that inflicted for first degree
murder to that for the least degree of manslaughter. The differences
11

Wright, J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen [1895] 1 Q.B. 918.
related issue is that of the criminal liability of corporations. The entire
problem of corporate misconduct and of criminal conduct by individuals wvho
operate behind the veil of a corporation should be re-examined in the light
of such studies as Sutherland, White Collar Crime (1949), the principles of
2

criminal liability, and the availability of non-punitive controls.
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in punishment correspond to significant differences in moral culpability represented in the offenders' states of mind at the time the homicides
were conmitted. The further modernization of the criminal law here,
too, would apply current progress to the existing law of felony-murder,
misdemeanor-manslaughter, especially to laws prescribing the severest sanctions, i.e., those imposed for first degree murder, where
there was no intention to commit any homicide or, in some states, even
any recklessness in causing death.
The thesis that criminal liability should be rested exclusively on
moral culpability does not represent an unwarranted inflexible attitude toward serious problems or a sentimental disinclination to use
sharp instrumentalities to meet social needs. On the contrary, since
the moral dimensions of human action are extremely wide, there is
ample range for penal law even if it is rigorously restricted to conduct
which is morally culpable. Nextly, the effectiveness of criminal law
is unavoidably bound up with the moral attitudes of the community.
Apprehension of offenders, initiation of prosecutions, what happens
thereafter, including verdicts, the crime rate, rehabilitation, etc., are
largely dependent upon public attitudes appreciative of the distinctive
character of criminal law. Accordingly, even canons of sheer efficiency
require the exclusion of non-culpable conduct from the range of
punitive sanctions so that public confusion, unsound rationalization,
and the like may be avoided. Finally, the progress of legal institutions has been from uniform, crude controls to complex, nicely differentiated ones. Revision of the criminal law should take account of
the numerous instrumentalities now available in non-penal law, if
effective rational controls of criminal conduct are to be forged. There
are other parts of the criminal law besides the four noted above, which
would need to be studied with regard to the determination of a sound,
coherent policy; some of the more urgent issues will be indicated
shortly.
Turning now to a different kind of inquiry, it is evident that we
have not come to grips with many serious legal problems in the light
of recent advances in the sciences and social disciplines. For example, there has been a considerable increase in psychiatric knowledge
in this century, raising difficult questions regarding certain rules of
criminal law. Recent discoveries concerning alcoholic and narcotic
addiction indicate that revision of other rules is necessary. Much
knowledge of sexual deviation has been added; and, however one may
criticize particular theories in this field, it is clear that the law on
sexual offenses has been neglected. Studies of juvenile delinquents
and youthful offenders indicate that here, too, a re-examination of
prevailing policies and laws is needed. Researches in the field of theft
are available to improve the existing law in many important respects.
These are only the more prominent areas of criminal law where sound
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revision requires a thorough use of the empirical knowledge provided
by the sciences and social disciplines.
Certain hazards confront those who participate in such work, which
must be considered from the outset. On the one hand, the notion has
prevailed among some lawyers and legal scholars that anything and
everything alleged in an expert's book has as great validity as the
laws of physics. These hopeful souls are eager to abandon the knowledge now embodied in the law and to substitute the expert's opinion
at the drop of a hat. On the other hand, there are stubborn legalists
who resent the possibility of any improvement in law, especially those
recommended by non-legal specialists. Unfortunately, there is no easy
solution of the difficulties met by those who strive simply and persistently to have the criminal law reflect the best available knowledge.
Frequently the investigator finds inconsistencies and conflicts among
the experts, making it extremely difficult to discover the better solutions. Nor can the community depend for improvement of a legal
institution upon experts who are unfamiliar with legal controls, purposes, and guarantees. By like token, the community cannot depend
upon merely technical lawyers to make careful appraisals of relevant
knowledge or to discover the best ways of implementing social objectives. The lawyers required to do this important work must have
open, inquiring minds, a zest for investigation, and a thorough appreciation of legal values-qualities that are easily specified but
which are actually rare in law, as elsewhere.
Revision of the criminal law, which in its thousands of cases represents the accumulated experience of centuries of thoughtful work,
is fraught with other potential dangers. Among the most serious of
these is that the principle of legality, the "rule of law," may be weakened. Anglo-American criminal law has long been jealous of the
rights of innocent persons and it has achieved a relatively high degree
of protection against governmental abuse through adherence to detailed rules of law which define criminal conduct precisely and place
strict limits on the punishment of offenders. Whatever one's opinion
may be concerning such specification and assurance in civil areas,
it will be agreed that it is of the utmost importance to preserve the
rule of law in the criminal field, where the sanctions are punitive and
the dignity of personality is deeply involved.
The issue becomes acute if wide generalizations are recommended
as substitutes for collections of cases bearing on a problem. There is
a natural tendency to avoid the intricacies of case law by substituting
general formulas which, at first sight, solve the existing complications. This tendency is particularly marked in codification of the
criminal law when the draftsman does not clearly distinguish civil
law from penal law. Some of the advantages of sound codification
have been noted above, e.g., instead of the handicap of isolated rules,
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there is an organization of the rules through use of doctrines and
principles. But it is also essential to consider that it is precisely in the
effort to draft a code (rather than merely to organize a body of
statutes) that the danger to the rule of law is greatest. The historic
debates on this subject between Field and Carter are available to any
who wish to review the respective claims of code law as against those
of case law. Initially, at least, the issues would seem to be weighted
definitely against penal codification because our criminal law consists
not only of case law but also of many statutes which have been interpreted in numerous cases-thus adding additional definiteness. The
pertinent question is--can the advantages of codification be secured
without impairment of the "rule of law," which is presently assured
by case law and statutes?
It is possible here merely to point to the advantages of directing
revision toward a model penal code (whether or not a penal code is
actually adopted) and, also, to suggest the retention of the present
safeguards if a code is to be adopted. As was indicated above, the
principal advantage of directing revision toward a code rather than
an organization of statutes is that in the former the problems of
systematization must be directly and fully confronted-with consequent important gains in knowledge of the criminal law.
With reference to adoption of a criminal code, the most important
safeguard would be retention of the existing case law, except where
specifically changed by the code, to provide precise definitions of the
provisions of the code wherever that is necessary. And secondly, where
the code departs from the existing criminal law, those provisions
should be subjected to the present tests of ambiguity and vagueness.
There can, of course, be no avoidance of the tests of "due process."
In addition, the common law rules governing the interpretation of
criminal statutes should be retained and applied to the code.13 The
codifier should make it clear where he is restating existing law, where
he is rejecting it, and where he is providing new rules.
The objectives of criminal law revision can be achieved in good
measure, despite the difficulties of the task, if full use is made of sound
methods of inquiry and research. In the writer's opinion, the time
has arrived when it is possible to place law revision upon a much
sounder foundation than any that could be constructed in the past.
Without indulging in fanciful prognostications regarding a "science of
law," we can accelerate legal progress considerably if we attack the
" That the Louisiana Supreme Court has used common law and previous
Louisiana law in interpreting the Louisiana criminal code is shown, e.g., in

State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.2d 329 (1948), and State v. Labrode, 202
La. 59, 11 So.2d 404 (1942). And see Morrow, The 1942 Louisiana Criminal

Code in 1945, 19 Tulane L. Rev. 483 (1945); Bennett, Criminal Law and Procedure, 8 La. L. Rev. 281 (1948); Note 8 La. L .Rev. 129 (1948).
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problems without inhibition as to methods of inquiry and with a careful eye to the utility of many methodological tools which are now
available.
Methods

The traditional methods employed in solving legal problems are
for the most part analytical and dialectical, i.e., they include critical
discussions which, however, are usually restricted to technical legal
questions. Without disparagement of these important methods, especially when they are illuminated by the experience of able lawyers, it
is submitted that mid-twentieth century revision of law should also
make full use of methods whose value has been well exemplified in
other fields.
The traditional methods, in their usual, restricted application, cannot fully attain the ends required by logic and organization. Study of
foreign penal codes and of treatises and essays on the systematization
of criminal law will be suggestive. But the discovery of doctrines and
principles and of their place and functions in the criminal law cannot
be greatly aided by methodological rules or descriptions of scientific
inquiry.
That sort of achievement depends, instead, on the participation and encouragement of sensitive minds interested in discovering
"the one among the many" and able to sustain thinking about many
discrete items and specific rules in relation to general concepts and
theories.
The second objective discussed above, i.e., the determination of a
sound coherent policy of the criminal law, is attainable in substantial
measure by thorough use of the traditional methods of discussion and
criticism. The success of this sort of inquiry depends largely on the
skillful presentation of all important points of view; accordingly,
necessary steps must be taken to make certain that the principal
divergent viewpoints are well represented. The discovery and articulation of a sound policy also depends, however, upon a thorough understanding of the criminal law which, in turn, waits upon progress in
systematization and upon the knowledge that can be derived from
empirical investigation, consultation with experts, and so on. The
latter needs, i.e., those dependent upon factual information and knowledge, should receive the most careful consideration because the
relevant methods are not well known, and there are other difficulties
in the way of using them on a large scale.
Despite the unnecessarily technical and sometimes bizarre language
employed in social science discussions of methodology, there is a great
deal to be learned from that literature, which can be used in criminal
law revision.14 There are, e.g., suggestive critiques of relevant theory
14
Cf. Hall, Some Basic Questions Regarding Legal Classification for Professional and Scientific Purposes, 5 J. Legal Educ. 341-2 (1953).
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and, more immediately significant, there are examples of the actual
use of various methods in successful researches, among which are
several socio-legal studies. It is impossible to analyze these studies
here, 1 but certain observations may be made to remove .'methods"
from the realms of cant and mystery and to indicate their utility for
revision of the criminal law.
First, the successful studies make it quite clear that the use of
effective methods of research depends not only upon spontaneous intelligence and insight but also, upon the testing of various potentially
helpful methods and techniques. Second, it has been shown that
methods are effective if they are chosen and adapted in direct reference
to the distinctiveness of problems, subject matter, and objectives, and
that it is futile to speculate on methods in isolation from needs and ends
or to debate in the abstract one type of method as compared with another. Third, and most important, the final results of inquiry in large
measure depend upon the quality and extent of the empirical research
that is carried on to acquire necessary information and knowledge;
and the success of that is determined by the methods used to carry
on the investigations.
The greatest bar to the use of methods needed for successful law
revision is the lack of appreciation of factual research, even though
it is recognized that the criminal law deals with social problems. This
is an anomalous situation because social problems are certainly manifested in many facts, and these facts can be understood by aid of
empirical and other knowledge. Rules of law, among other purposes,
serve as effective instruments if they are suited to the distinctive
characteristics of social problems. In sum, legal instruments, as well
as methods of research, make sense in terms of subject matter and
objectives. Some specific instances may clarify and lend persuasiveness
to these observations.
Even the best of lawyers, if they confined their research to the law
on receiving stolen property, including the statutes, cases, and the professional literature, would never come to close grips with the relevant
•ocial problems. But factual research quickly led to discoveries of
the utmost importance for understanding the social problem and,
t3.-ice, to appraisal of existing law and formulation of sound lines of
legal revision. It was discovered, e.g., that there are large businesses
which deal in millions of dollars' worth of stolen commodities each
year, that these businesses have interstate connections extending over
the entire country, that the offenders are astute, experienced men,
etc., etc. It was thus established, among other important conclusions,
" The theory of methods of socio-legal research is discussed in Hall, Theft,
Law and Society (2d ed. 1952), especially in the Introduction; and see the
Index.
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that there are vast differences between that kind of "receiving" stolen
property and individual violations by persons who, once or twice in a
lifetime, buy stolen property for their own consumption.
With reference to the wide incidence of intoxication and addiction
to narcotics in criminal conduct, if inquiry is limited to the statutes and
cases, there will be little insight into the personality of the offenders
and less understanding of the significance of related facts. But once
investigation concentrates also upon the factual data and upon the
medical and scientific literature which makes it possible to interpret
these facts as they are met in legal problems, policy becomes informed
and the road has been cleared for a sound revision of the law.
Again, as regards automobile theft, the statutes on larceny and the
propaganda of insurance companies do not begin to reveal the social
realities. But when there is an investigation of the facts, it becomes
known, e.g., that about ninety-five per cent of the automobiles "stolen"
are soon abandoned in good condition, that they were taken for "joy
rides," usually by youngsters under twenty years of age, without prior
criminal records, and so on. That phase of the social problem differs
sharply from the facts of larceny, and both differ from the depredations
of the professionals, whose attendant organizations, including the
inevitable criminal receiver, comprise distinctive configurations. Once
these facts are known and understood, does it make sense to retain a
single automobile larceny statute or a grand larceny statute or, indeed,
to stop short of a revision which will register sensitivity to important
differences in facts, social problems, and the meanings of the respective situations?
Finally, in the agitated area of sexual offenses, it must be obvious
that the limitation of inquiry to cases and statutes is grossly inadequate. The impetuous reaction of legislators to a vicious crime and
consequent public hysteria is apt to result in legislation which is very
cruel and violative of elementary legal safeguards. Adequate, defensible controls can be invented only if the relevant facts are known,
together with the available knowledge of the personality of sexual
offenders, the etiology of their offenses, and so on. We shall never
know enough facts and psychology to satisfy every doubt, but before
officials are empowered to imprison human beings for many years,
every possible effort should be made to provide legal controls which are
defensible on rational grounds.
There are proven methods of exploring social problems and there
are sound ways of discovering and appraising the relevant empirical
knowledge. To assure the use of these methods, rather than to depend upon whatever resources are conveniently at hand, is the condition of successful criminal law revision.1 6

'aId. at 349-356.
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It is equally important to appreciate the need for knowledge of the
administration of criminal law because that is probably the best index
of the soundness of the substantive law. For example, when Illinois
lacked a "joy ride" statute, the judges and prosecutors of that state
agreed to wholesale waivers of the felony of automobile larceny (punishable by one to twenty years' imprisonment) and accepted pleas of
guilty to petty larceny, e.g., to stealing a tire. A knowledge of those
facts regarding the administration of the Illinois automobile larceny
law would certainly raise serious questions of substantive reform. The
facts of other, equally significant administrative practices are not well
known, nor have they been collected in careful detaiL Basic criminal
law revision would include or presuppose factual studies of the administration of important substantive laws.
No better instance of this need can be given than that concerning
embezzlement. Revision based on legal and factual research into the
social problems of embezzlement, though necessary, do not suffice.
Only when one probes into the administration of the laws on embezzlement does the substantive legal problem become illuminated by
the knowledge thus acquired. To some extent this kind of knowledge
can be gotten by consulting prosecuting attorneys and judges who have
had considerable experience with embezzlement cases. But knowledge
that is precise and systematic is much more meaningful, and it reveals
.definite possibilities for the invention of new controls. For example,
research in this area discloses that a very small percentage of known
embezzlers are prosecuted despite the fact that embezzlement is one
of the most common and costliest of all crimes. It reveals that far
more frequently than with any other comparable offense, prosecution
terminates in the grant of probation, and so on. Investigation of the
facts of the operation of the laws on embezzlement points to serious
shortcomings in the substantive laws. It indicates that, e.g., the prevailing assumption among criminal law specialists that there should
be an inclusive theft statute (as in California) in which embezzlement,
larceny, and fraud are subjected to the same sanctions may need to be
re-examined. It suggests the need for laws to cope with widespread
practices of businessmen and surety companies to enter into arrangements to withhold prosecution. It will raise other important questions
in the minds of lawyers who become familiar with the actual embezzlement problem and the administration of the criminal law in
this area. 17
Thus, if the soundest possible revision is the objective, no academic
theory or predilection is involved in insistence on the need for factual
information regarding certain social problems and the administration
of present laws, and for a thorough understanding of the relevant
11

Id. at Chapter 7.
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empirical knowledge. With reference to many of the problems that
need to be faced in criminal law revision there are available published
studies, collections of data, statistical reports, expert opinions and,
not least, the experience of judges and lawyers in specialized areas.
All of this information and knowledge can be rendered useful if care
is taken to formulate pertinent legal questions directed toward the
objectives of criminal law revision. In other areas, however, the facts
and. the necessary knowledge are not readily at hand, waiting to be
tapped. Considerable research and many facilities are required to
supply the information and relevant knowledge. The facilities, including a properly equipped personnel, are not easily obtained in the
field of law. Indeed, the history of law revision has been one of individual, short-time inquiries conducted by traditional methods.
If efforts to improve the law and keep it always, so far as possible,
abreast of established knowledge, were placed upon a permanent
basis, the limitations of separate short-term projects could be avoided.
Freed of pressure to complete a very difficult task within a short period
of time, thinking would rise to the level needed to satisfy permanent
needs, and the best methods of research would be used. No large
commercial or industrial concern would modify its practices and adopt
major change in policy without the most careful investigation. The
good sense thus manifested and expected should be applied to law

revision.1s
In no field of law are the prospects of great achievement more
promising than in the criminal law. Here, if anywhere, it is possible
to exemplify the superiority of law revision based upon the thorough
use of sound methods of research and available empirical knowledge.
And if very important progress were clearly and definitely achieved
in criminal law revision, who would discount the effects upon other
fields of law, the enlarged functions of the legal profession, and the
added resources of a troubled world which needs to understand law
and legal ways of preserving the values of civilization?

18 The existing law revision commissions represent traditional perspectives.
For the reasons indicated above, it is desirable to include factual research and
to provide a personnel equipped to carry on both the legal and the empirical
investigations.

